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THE  "PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF 
LANGUAGE." 
By A. M.  HOCART. 
Current psychological interpretation of the language of savages—Its 
neglect of the social context—The social factors underlying the 
presence or absence of linguistic distinctions—The importance of 
historical factors. 
THE doctrine seems fairly well established among comparative psychologists 
that savage languages are encumbered with useless distinctions which civilised 
man has learnt to discard and that they are poor in general concepts and rich in 
minute subdivisions of the species; dearth of ideas and superfluity of words are 
their failing. 
This view may seem quite impregnable to the thinker at home, and, as it once 
seemed so to me, I cannot well blame those whose faith has never been exposed 
to that powerful dissolvent, experience of savage life. A few linguistic facts 
picked from various treatises and isolated from their vast context, which is no 
less than the whole life of the people, are just what tends to breed a false 
confidence of truth secured once for all Even eminent psychologists have fallen 
into this pitfall from which few pioneers escape; they will not therefore take it 
amiss if I give them a caution, and advise them to desist from the psychological 
interpretation of language unless they are conversant with the life and language 
of the people. Their knowledge must embrace everything that savages do, or 
think, or say; for how can we judge of a language till we know the uses it is put 
to and the thoughts it is required to express? 
I do not wish to be dogmatic, or claim to set up a theory of language. I shall 
merely content myself with showing that some facts quoted in illustration of the 
orthodox theory can be subjected to a totally different interpretation. I shall take 
my text from the writings of Prof Stout. In his Analytic Psychology (1902, ii. 
231) we read: 
" The occurrence of distinctions of this kind in savage languages is 
sometimes regarded as a mark of their superior accuracy and subtlety, 
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as compared with civilised tongues. Thus the missionary Williams speaks 
of the ' precision and perfection' of certain Polynesian dialects, and refers 
especially to ' nice distinctions in the pronouns.'" Prof. Stout goes on to 
quote Williams: " A short time since, I was dining at Bath, when the lady 
of the house desired the servant to bring a plate, and, politely addressing 
me, said,' Put your bones upon the plate, sir.' Now, common as this 
expression is, it is certainly rather ambiguous. In the language of the 
Polynesians, however, there would be no such ambiguity, for they have 
two pronouns to express the difference, tooe and taoe; the former of 
which would be used if my own bones were meant; and the latter if those 
of the pheasant of which I had been partaking." Prof Stout remarks: "It 
certainly appears odd that a lower grade of intellectual development 
should be marked by superior nicety and precision of discriminative 
thought. The truth is that these distinctions, so plentiful in savage 
languages, are due rather to an incapacity for clearly apprehending 
identity in difference, than to a superior power of apprehending difference 
in identity....Similarly the savage mind has not pushed its analysis far 
enough to be able to reconstruct certain complex concepts out of simpler. 
Hence it simply takes the complex concept in its unanalysed totality and 
marks it by a separate sound." 
Now, there is no doubt that the above distinction is in this particular 
case quite superfluous, but, until we know the whole language thoroughly, 
we cannot be certain that these two possessives do not sometimes express 
a vital difference, which we ourselves are compelled to cast into another 
form. The fact that words are superfluous in one case no. more proves that 
they are unnecessary duplicates than the overlapping of government 
departments in some matters would justify the suppression of any. 
Overlapping is a defect of languages, nay of all classifications, of which 
language is but one particular case. 
Suppose a Fijian Williams were to visit England and, returning home, 
should laud to his countrymen the nice distinctions of which that 
country's language is capable, he might point out that for the Fijian 
sentence au tiko e na imbe, English has two—'-I am sitting on the mat,' or 
'I am sitting in the mat,' as the case may be; Fijian is ambiguous, English 
is accurate, so accurate as to seat you in an armchair, but on a chair; Fijian 
has but one vague ' e' to serve all turns. A Fijian philosopher might rebuke 
the Fijian Williams, pointing out that this scrupulousness is excessive and 
that Fijian is superior in omitting to point out what every man can see for 
himself; for who can doubt the exact meaning of au tiko e na imbe ?.    
Would anyone 
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hesitate as to whether I am sitting on the top or inside ? We do not require 
in and on to tell us how we use a chair and an armchair. Bather these 
distinctions, so plentiful in English, betray an incapacity for clearly 
apprehending identity in difference. Fijian is the more advanced since it 
has a word to express position in the abstract, whereas English has a 
different preposition for each several position, and has not yet evolved a 
common term for all1. Here a Fijian resident in England, who had read the 
Fijian philosopher and derived much benefit from his work, might 
interfere as a third party and argue: " It is true that in the examples 
adduced a single word would have done, but there are other instances in 
which it is not so; and it is true that language has been compelled to 
evolve several prepositions ' in,'' on,' ' at,' ' by,' eta, because white men 
make great use of tables, drawers, boxes, machinery, geometry, 
surveying, literary descriptions, which all require the most accurate 
definition, whereas we Fijians are but little addicted to description, and 
that of the baldest kind. Therefore they must keep a good stock of 
prepositions for technical use, which can also serve for the finest 
subtleties, even as we do in our own tongue. Thus a man who lies on his 
bed is taking a siesta; if in his bed, he has turned in to sleep or is 
invalided; we always lie on our beds. A motor is in town if it is in the 
road, and in the country if on the rood; we have no towns. There is all the 
difference between a nail on the table and one that is in it; we had no 
tables till the white man came. Having thus evolved, by some process or 
other, these particular forms, the white men have apportioned among 
them the whole realm of position and have left no room for a general 
term, no indefinite, indeterminate sphere; for they, like all other people, 
speak for practical purposes and not in order to satisfy psychologists that 
they possess the analytic faculty. No matter, therefore, whether position is 
obvious from the context or not, you must define it, because none but 
definite terms are at hand; we know perfectly well how a man is sitting if 
a mat is his seat, yet to substitute on that ground in for on would shock the 
genius of the language by its incongruity, because in has a 
determinateness incompatible with the present case, and white men do not 
keep an indefinite preposition merely for the pleasure of it." Thus our 
Fijian third party; we must try and be as fair as he. 
I do not know the language of the Cook Islands, but I do know 
1 We are compelled to say: Dogs are not allowed in or on this car; the Fijian e na 
ngginggi would cover all cases. 
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Fijian, which has exactly the same idiom. Only the number of Fijian 
possessives is four, not two, and it would seem a hard task to defend them 
all; there is one for parts of the body (-nggu, etc.), one for property 
(nonggu, etc.), one for food (kenggu, etc.), and one for drink (menggu, 
etc.). Better plead guilty at once. But Fijian refuses to plead guilty and 
invokes the following cases in its discharge: na ndakunggu is 'my back,' 
but nonggu ndaku is 'my sister-in-law,' because I turn my back to her. E 
yasanggu is 'beside me,' but e nonggu yasa is 'in the side of the house 
which it is my duty to build.' Mena kai is 'his mussel to eat' (or rather 'to 
drink,' as the Fijian says); nona kai is ' his shell' which he, or rather she, 
uses to split leaves for mat-making; kena kai is 'his marks' or 'points,' the 
tokens of which were once presumably shells. Waina is ' its juice' or ' 
milk'; nona wai is ' his medicine' which he owns as a leech ; kena wia is ' 
the medicine for that disease'; mena wai is ' water for him to drink,' or ' 
medicine for him to take1.' Kalou ni nona and kalou ni kena are both ' 
spirits of his,' but one is a spirit of his property, who brings him 
abundance of fabrics (iyau), and the other is a spirit of his food (kakana), 
who makes him successful in fishing, or hunting, or planting. Here we 
touch upon the influence of social customs upon language, for there can 
be little doubt that the separate existence of the property and food 
pronouns has been strengthened by the fundamental contrast between 
fabrics and food which are the two great categories of Fijian activity and 
social intercourse. 
Moreover, to isolate, as is usual, the word from its context is certainly 
unfair to the language; it seems ridiculous to say nonggu kote for 'my 
coat,' but kenggu mandrai for 'my bread'; but let us take whole sentences 
and the matter wears a different aspect: kauta mai nonggu kote is 'bring 
my coat,' while kauta mai na kenggu mandrai is ' bring me some bread,' 
or' bring me my portion of bread.' If English has different constructions 
Fijian is entitled to different pronouns; they merely use different means to 
do the same work. 
So far from occupying a sinecure the food possessive -has gradually 
absorbed new functions and greatly extended the sphere of its activity: a 
nona nggase is ' his old man,' ie.' father'; but a kena nggase is ' the elder 
one.' Fijian has for historical reasons, as yet unknown, developed four 
possessives among which it has apportioned the whole sphere of 
possession; the frontiers are often arbitrary; indeterminate cases are 
treated as if determinate; but what of that ? Is it not better than to  
1 This example is given in part by Hazlewood in his Fijian Dictionary. 





invent a fifth pronoun for the sake of logic ? Are the yams I have planted 
nonggu or kenggu ? I may possibly never eat them, and shall certainly 
never eat them all, but as I planted them for me and my family to eat we 
shall make it kenggu. Language is no hair-splitter; it would sooner be 
inaccurate than stock words for rare cases. So long as in ninety-nine cases 
out of a hundred there can be no doubt about the right possessive, the 
hundredth case can take care of itself We do not keep a generalised 
preposition simply because we may not be certain at times whether a 
thing is in or on a box, and whether the plate in question is a soup plate in 
which, or a flat plate on which, we put food. 
In Central Asia they have a name for each kind of horse according to 
the nature and distribution of its colour, but no word for a horse in 
general1. This seems a triumphant proof of analytic weakness in savages; 
but hold! Do we know everything that an Asiatic thinks, says or does in 
regard to horses? Tell us that and we may judge; for colour may be all 
important to them: they may have superstitious or physiological ideas 
about it, or it may be a privilege of rank, or the price may depend upon it; 
in fine there may be a thousand and one reasons why colour should make 
a difference. Do we not use black horses for funerals, and white ones for a 
coronation ? We have quite a number of colour terms reserved almost 
exclusively for horses, such as roan, dappled, bay, chestnut; lately I came 
across a French word for a horse with a black head. I think I am right in 
saying that a horsey person never speaks of a stallion or a mare as a 
horse. 
We may go through life without ever noticing that whereas we have 
words for a bull, a cow, an ox, a calf, a heifer, etc., we have none for the 
species except cattle which is collective; in fact the French have had to 
invent bovidé for neutral cases in archaeology2. Does that prove that we 
simply take "the complex concept in its unanalysed totality?" The reason 
merely is that the bovidé is the most important domestic animal, and 
furthermore that difference of sex makes all the difference in practical 
use: the mare, the horse, and the stallion are all used for riding, but a bull 
is kept for breeding, an ox for work and meat, a cow for milk, and the 
calf gives a special kind of meat. It is only when they arc mingled 
together in a crowd that we need the general term 'cattle.'    In the rare 
cases of uncertainty (and I have 
1  See Radloff, Zeitsch..f. Ethnol. 1871, iii. 285. 
2  My attention was drawn to this word by Mr Marett 
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never yet come across one) there is no harm done if the beast is called a 
cow and turns out to be an ox. It would be interesting to find out how a 
slum boy uses the words. 
Returning to the language of savages after the sobering experiences of 
our own, we shall find that the same rules hold good of them. Here is a 
case which warns us how differences, slight in our eyes, may carry with 
them a whole train of practical differences for the savage. The Solomon 
Islands possess a most useful nut, the kanary, which engrosses much of 
the islanders' interests and fills much of their existence. In those parts 
investigated by Dr Rivers and myself they distinguished two kinds: the 
vino and the ngari; in our eyes it was merely a difference of size, and we 
might never have considered them otherwise than as large and small 
specimens had not the natives given us the two words. Yet closely related 
as they are, they have no common term. Had we proceeded no further, we 
might have ascribed this deficiency to " an incapacity for clearly 
apprehending identity in difference.'' But is it reasonable to suppose that 
an identity so glaring could not peep through the thin veil of differences ? 
Why should we, white men, start from identity to end in a perception of 
differences and the savage work in the opposite direction ? If instead of 
contenting ourselves with a vocabulary we inquire into the practical uses 
of the kanary, we shall be compelled to justify the savages. We found that 
from trifling differences sprang a host of momentous ones—technical, 
commercial, and religious: the seasons of the two species do not coincide; 
they are gathered differently, because the branches of the vino will bear a 
man and the ngari will not; they are cracked differently because the ngari 
is larger, and in one island this was the object of a taboo; they are 
preserved differently: the vino is pounded and made into a package, then 
smoked; the ngari is smoked in the shell; the vino coming early supplies 
the offerings of first fruits, while the ngari, being abundant, is used for the 
later smoked-nuts festival; in certain diseases the one is tabooed as food 
and the other not; the two, in fact, are only identical in the kitchen, and 
therefore they have but one word for the roasted kernels and puddings of 
either. A common term would normally be as useless to them as bovidé to 
all of us who are not scientific men. 
Take the coconut again: every stage of its growth has a name, and a 
South Sea language may recognise as many as nine. We need neither 
exclaim over the richness of their language nor decry their analytic 
powers. They have done but what we should have done if coconuts grew 
in Europe.    The reason is simply that, whereas other 
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fruits are either ripe or unripe, each stage of the coconut's growth makes a 
practical difference: in one it is not edible, in the next it may have milk 
but no flesh; the shell of one is edible, later it is too hard; as it approaches 
maturity it is drink for man and food for pigs; later it is prized as food and 
despised as drink; the stage of development has to be ascertained by 
Slipping the nut, because it is opened differently according as the shell is 
hard or soft. So necessary are these words that the white resident will 
inevitably adopt into his English such as are of practical use to him. 
A great many languages that use the classificatory system have a word 
for elder and one for younger brother, but none for both; but all students 
of kinship will know that seniority is rich in social consequences; a man 
must always know who is his senior and who his junior, and is always 
able to specify which ; he has a collective term for both, however, since a 
collection of brothers contains elder and younger. On the other hand, we 
have a word for brother and one for sister, but none that leaves the sex 
indifferent; savages have such a word1. 
Take again the particles quoted by Prof. Stout (op. cit., p. 230). Are 
distinctions between " to cut in two with a knife, to shoot off, to cut off 
with an axe, to break off with the foot, to break off with the hand, to bite 
off," so superfluous that a special word for each argues a low mental 
development ? especially if we do more justice to them by translating 
them: " to cut in two with a knife, to shoot off, to chop off, to stamp off, 
to snap off, to bite off." In dealing with such people we must always 
remember that they do not live in studies or in towns, retaining a purely 
theoretic interest in many kinds of action ; they are all handy men and 
jacks of all trades,—handy men in the literal sense, for they have no 
machinery but do everything by hand; modes of action, therefore, which 
are unimportant to us are most weighty to them. Thus a yam is not slashed 
at (taya) except by accident or malevolence, but it can be cut lengthwise 
(kola) or crosswise (suvi), a matter not indifferent in planting; expert 
planters slit (sei) them part of the way down; before cooking it may be cut 
up or chopped up (dhembe) to boil. To appreciate their point of view one 
must have tried to live their life, or at least watched them at their work 
and got interested in the same; failing that, let a man take to the sea_or go 
a-farming and he will soon find that each mode of life has its minute 
vocabulary that is as necessary as it is rich. 
1 Cf. W. H. B. Rivers, "The Primitive Conception of Death," Hibbert Journal, 1912, 
x.401. 
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I shall leave American Indian particles alone, as I know nothing about 
that language. I will point out only that Fijian also is rich in them though 
it uses them for different purposes, but no one will question the need of 
them: nunu-va means to dive for a thing; nunu-vaka means to dive with it. 
If English finds it necessary to use two different prepositions, a savage 
language has the right to use two suffixes. A Fijian taking the same 
standpoint as Prof. Stout might, in fact, maintain the superiority of his 
own language since English has, for instance, a different root to express 
every idea connected with sight, but no general term, whereas his own 
tongue has a term as wide as could be desired, which is particularised by 
means of suffixes and reduplication, thus: 
rai: to see, to have eyesight, to look, to appear; 
rairai: to seem, appear; 
rai-dha: to see; 
vakaraidha: to look at, look for, seek; 
vakaraitaka: to show; 
irairai: appearance. 
In fact Fijian words are often so purged of all concreteness that we have 
not their equivalent for abstraction in English. To the above rai we can 
add rongo, which designates both sound and hearing; ndre is the action of 
pulling in the widest sense, without definition of active or passive; the 
addition of particles defines it as pulling a thing, or being pulled, pulling 
against each other, confirming, difficult, obstructing, etc. What a 
European, continually using a savage language, wearies of is not the 
excess of minute distinctions, but the vagueness of concepts so wide that 
they cannot convey the distinctions which he takes an interest in and 
which alone make conversation worth while to him: he cannot speak of 
trees without including all plants; he cannot take the birds and leave the 
bats and butterflies; he has but one word to use whether he is discussing 
ambition, rivalry, or jealousy: in translating lialia into English he must 
consider whether mad, foolish, simple, idiotic or ignorant will suit the 
context, because English has no word to express intellectual deficiency in 
general; after trying ' words,' ' sayings,' ' speeches,' to render vosa he may 
have to adopt ' maxims,' and yet be dissatisfied because it is too precise. 
The language in the end seems so poor to him, so destitute of specific 
terms, simply because he insists on saying things that he takes a detailed 
interest in, but not the Fijian, and wants to be minute where a Fijian is 
quite content with handling in gross.   Let him turn to planting, to 
handicrafts, and 
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war, and he will find as precise and minute a vocabulary as he may 
require. 
Admitting that savage languages are addicted to particular terms and 
neglect the generic, yet it is strange that this should be cast at them as a 
reproach when it constitutes one of the chief excellencies of style. Is it 
not the rule always to use the lowest possible genus, and does not 
insipidity result from the use of a general term when there is a more 
particular one ? Good prose is to a great extent the use of the exact word, 
and the exact word is the narrowest that will fit. 
Sometimes, indeed, the particular term is so unusual in certain con-
texts that the general one is not allowed even where it would be the right 
one. We cannot say to a South Sea Islander, " Come and see me after 
lunch, or tea, or dinner, or supper"; because all South Sea meals are 
identical and none of these terms will describe them; yet if we try 'after 
meal' the King's English takes offence; the only loophole of escape is to 
use the Polynesian kaikai or the slang ' grub.' Dr Rivers points out to me 
that of old a man might have said 'after meat'; doubtless meals were less 
highly differentiated then, but according to the orthodox theory we 
moderns must be going backwards. 
Learning a language we use a dictionary, but studying it we must set 
it aside and observe the practical use of words. For it is the business of 
dictionaries to define per genus et speciem; they must therefore make 
words represent genera, which, in actual practice, are specific; we are 
therefore apt to imagine that we are richer in general terms than we really 
are. A dictionary may define 'bowling' as 'a mode of throwing,' but the 
rules of the game oppose them to one another, and a man who speaks of a 
bowler throwing the ball either does not know the game or means it is no-
ball. A Martian might draw thence interesting conclusions regarding the 
analytic powers of French and English; but we know it is all a matter of 
playing or not playing cricket. 
A cock crows, a hen cackles, a pigeon cooes, a jackdaw caws, other 
birds sing or chirp or warble, but they cannot cry as they all do in Fijian. 
Is Fijian therefore more advanced in ornithology? On the contrary, it is 
because they take no interest in birds that they have but one word; our 
variety of terms is the outcome of abundant bird life, farmyards, egg-
eating, shot-guns, singing-birds, pets and poetry. Dictionaries do require a 
common term for the purposes of definition; they are allowed to say that 
crowing is the cry of the cock, but fancy our reciting: " This is the cock 
that cried in the morn." 
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Wool is a species of hair, but no one ever speaks of sheep's hair. The 
French crin can be subsumed under poil, but in practice they exclude one 
another: a poil de cheval comes from any part of the body except the 
mane and the tail. 
If I may put it paradoxically, the very indefiniteness of a term 
constitutes its definition ; the fact that it is general makes it quite plain that 
it is not particular: if a bowler throws, he does not bowl; if a pigeon cries it 
does not coo; say a hair, and, whatever it may be, it is not wool. Logic 
assigns one conceptual area to one word, and then subdivides this area into 
narrower concepts and so on, as Europe is divided into states, states into 
provinces, provinces into districts. But practice gives to one word the vast 
uninteresting, indefinite part of a concept and to others the various 
interesting, definite, analysed portions; for instance, it classifies into 
throwing in general and bowling, jerking, pitching, flinging, hurling in 
particular; the whole class is called after its widest member throwing. It is 
as though our geography should distinguish England, Scotland, Wales, 
and Ireland, and lump together the unanalysed residue as Europe; yet 
when we wished to speak of the continent and the British Islands as a 
whole we also called it Europe. 
If our dictionaries, excellent for their purpose, are quite inadequate for 
the psychological interpretation of language, how much more so are 
vocabularies of savage languages, which, even when they are not poor, 
cannot in the nature of things give more than approximate equivalents of 
native terms. Of the injustice thus done to savage languages here is a 
striking instance: Williams1 says Fijians have a word for clapping hands 
lengthwise, and one for clapping crosswise ; now, these definitions of 
sausau and dhambo respectively are sufficient for identification, but do 
not by a long way exhaust the whole connotation of these words: sausau 
is a rapid, high-pitched clap used to mark the rhythm in dances; dhambo 
is a slow, hollow clap which expresses respect for a superior; Fijian no 
more requires a common term for both than we do for bowing and playing 
the piano. 
Much unnecessary admiration has in consequence been spent upon the 
supposed richness of savage languages and many undeserved strictures. 
The same Williams counts fourteen Fijian words for cutting. He does not 
give the fourteen, but here are as many as I can think of, or find in 
Hazlewood's dictionary: 
ta, sele, koti, musu, dhembe, kola, suvi, sivi, se, tava. 1 
Fiji and the Fijians, 161. 
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to shear, \ to clip.  
to cut across, to 
break off. 




' to rip, 
to split, 
to cut in twain     
along the fibre. 
 to cut, to 
operate,  to 
slit. 
That is twenty-one to ten: where is the richness of Fijian ? and which 
of the two is more zealous in expressing minute distinctions? such as ' 
hash' and ' mince,' ' snip' and ' clip.' It may be objected that English has a 
general term as well as particular ones. Has it ? Does a sculptor cut wood, 
a surgeon cut his patient1, or a shepherd cut wool ? If cut is accepted as 
the genus, yet Fijian is only inferior in having two terms, ta and sele, 
instead of one, as we may expect from a vocabulary framed at a time 
when cutting with a bamboo knife and cutting with a stone axe were as 
radically different as chopping and sawing: now that steel knives can be 
used in both ways we are apt to miss the point of this dualism. Thus we 
require a knowledge not merely of the present conditions of the race, but 
also of their primitive technique. 
We have so far reasoned as if language sprang, Minerva-like, from 
1 Dr Rivera points out that he does 'cut,' bat only in a highly technical sense, namely 
for stone. 
  
Now it is very true that all of these words are sometimes translated cut, 
but equally true that they are not confined within the limits of that word: 
they all overlap with it, but all overlap too with other English words, so 
that by a different arrangement we can prove the superiority of English, 
since to every one of the words we have quoted correspond two or three of 




Sele      to cut                                              koti          to cut 
             to carve                                                          to snip     
             to amputate                         to shear  
             to castrate                  to clip 
 
tá (ta)  to cut                                             musu  to cut across 
               to chop     to break off 
    to hew 
  to fell             dhembe  to cut up  
  to hack     to hash 
  to notch     to mince 
  to slash 
 
kola  to cut     }                                    se   to rip 
  to slice  } lenghtwise   to split 
      to cut in twain 
suvi  to slice   }       along the fibre 
  to carve  } crosswise 
                                                                 tava  to cut 
sivi  to hack     to operate 
  to chip    to slit 
  to adze   
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the human brain, ready to meet any contingency. But as a matter of fact, 
each stage of a language is conditioned by an antecedent stage. When we 
have proved that a word is useful, we have explained its survival but not 
its origin. If we convict it of uselessness, we may safely predict its death; 
but the fact that it is useless now, proves nothing about the mental state of 
the people who still use it: it may have been adapted to a primitive 
technique, now disappeared; even the fact that it always was useless 
proves nothing at all, because it may have been forced upon the people by 
the material at their disposal. Each generation is provided with a certain 
material to work with, and it makes the best of it; the best may not be very 
good, but that is no more a proof of low mental development than the use 
of stone implements is, where iron was never heard of. Fijian supplies us 
with a good example: it has two main prepositions for our ' in': e, in the 
same place as the speaker, and mai, in another place; thus a Fijian says e 
Viti for ' in Fiji,' but mai Samoa. Now these prepositions are certainly 
demonstratives in their origin: e is still used to mean here, and mai for 
yonder; it would appear then that to express '1 am in Fiji,' the Fijian began 
by saying: 'I am here Fiji'; that was out of question when speaking of 
Samoa, for Samoa is not here but there; he had therefore to say: ' He is 
there Samoa.' How far Fijians are still conscious of the proximity and 
distance attached to e and mai in their role of preposition we cannot tell; 
when that consciousness dies out we may expect to see e ousting mai or 
mai ousting e, unless the Fijians have died out first. 
It is strange indeed that historical conditions, the importance of which 
is so obvious in explaining our own language, should be completely 
ignored in the psychological interpretation of savage languages. Suppose 
a savage accused us of having more words than ideas and quoted in his 
support ' commence' and ' begin,' ' end' and ' finish,' 'food' and 'nutriment,' 
'God' and 'Deity,' 'image' and 'idol,' etc.— " My dear Sir," we should 
protest, " read your history before you talk. Then you would know that 
England was conquered by the Normans who spoke French, and that our 
medieval scholars borrowed many words from the Latin and Greek. Some 
of these immigrant duplicates are kept up by pedantry; others, like ' 
nutriment have received a scientific meaning, or, like ' beef and ' mutton,' 
a practical use." But who knows how many invasions, conquests, 
migrations, have not swept over Africa, Oceania and America ? Yet most 
English students have hitherto gone on the tacit assumption that languages 
grew up among savages just like a plant out of the soil, and they 
confidently explain psychologically 
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a plethora of words, which, when it exists at all, may be due to mixture of 
races. The four numbers of Fijian they would interpret as a mark of 
intellectual shortcoming; but it is most likely that they are the outcome of 
invasions; for neither dual nor trial can be explained by Fijian laws of 
sound changes, and the dual is in the third person but a replica of the 
plural. Without entering into details we may represent what may have 
happened thus: one people said 
'he' for 'one,' 
' they two' for ' any number'; the 
other said: 
' he' for ' one,' 
' they twain' for ' two,' 
' they three' for ' three or more.' 
Coalescing they produced: 
singular,' he'; 
dual,' they twain'; 
trial,' they three'; 
plural,' they two.' The abundance of numbers thus 
developed by accident has been made use of: the trial expresses a small 
group—the gens, the household, the passengers on a canoe, etc.; the plural 
expresses an unlimited number —keitou is ' we,' the members of the gens, 
keimami is ' we,' Fijians. 
The whole historical argument seems so obvious that we are almost 
ashamed to insist upon it, and hasten to close it with this question: Is it 
possible from the tangled skein of savage history to unravel the mental 
processes that have moulded the language and apportion exactly the 
influence of mind and the influence of material ? Certainly not at present; 
historical research may at any turn belie the psychological inference. A 
further question is: Would it be the duty of linguistics and ethnology to 
do so ? If the example of geology can be safely invoked we shall answer 
no: geology does not seek for new physical laws; it applies those derived 
from the observation of nature to the data of the globe's crust in order to 
reconstruct the history of the earth. Such also seems to be the function of 
ethnology, of which linguistics is but a branch : from the facts of 
language, customs, and religion, to restore the past history of man 
according to known laws, known because we can see them happening 
around us, or trace them in documents. Phonetics has begun to achieve 
this, and there is no reason why the whole of philology and ethnology 
should not. 
(Manuscript received 5 June, 1912.) 
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